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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
by Charles L Babcock* and Bryan C. Collins**
I. AccEss TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
I n 1989, the 71st Texas Legislature completed a major revision of the
Texas Open Records Act,' including a provision which was promptly
repealed only a few weeks later during a special session.2 Additionally,
the legislature directed the Texas Supreme Court to promulgate a rule deal-
ing with sealed court records3 and a committee has begun work on new
Texas Supreme Court Rule 76a.4 The legislature modified the Texas Open
* A.B., Brown University; J.D., Boston University. Attorney at Law, Jackson &
Walker, Dallas, Texas.
** A.B. Stanford University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Jackson &
Walker, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1990). The policy declara-
tion set forth in section 1 of the Texas Open Records Act provides:
Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of
representative government which holds to the principle that government is the
servant of the people, and not the master of them, it is hereby declared to be the
public policy of the State of Texas that all persons are, unless otherwise ex-
pressly provided by law, at all times entitled to full and complete information
regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent
them as public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do
not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to
know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining
informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have cre-
ated. To that end, the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed with the
view of carrying out the above declaration of public policy.
2. The new statute provided that "information that identifies or serves to identify a per-
son who, based on information in the possession of the governmental body, appears to have
been the victim of an offense that is a felony" is exempted from public disclosure. A subd. (23)
of subsec. 3(a) added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., Chap. 326, § 1, eff. June 14, 1989, was repealed
by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., 1st C.S., chap. 4, § 2, eft. July 21, 1989.
3. The Texas Legislature adopted section 22.010 of the Texas Government Code effective
September 1, 1989, which provides that "M']he Supreme Court shall adopt rules establishing
guidelines for the courts of this state to use in determining whether in the interest of justice the
records in a civil case, including settlements, should be sealed." Tax. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 22.010 (Vernon Supp. 1990). The Texas Supreme Court submitted the issue to the Texas
Supreme Court advisory committee and Chairman Luke Soles appointed a subcommittee to
propose a draft rule. The subcommittee conducted two public hearings and the Supreme
Court had a public hearing on November 30, 1989. A draft rule 76a was submitted to the
Supreme Court and is expected to be effective in June, 1990.
4. Rule 76a as submitted to the court provides as follows:
A. Definitions
1. Compelling Need: "Compelling Need" means the existence of a spe-
cific protectible interest which overrides the presumption that all court records
are open to the general public. The moving party must establish the following:
(a) that a specific interest of the person or entity sought to be protected by
the sealing of the court records clearly outweighs the interest in open
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court records and the specific interest will suffer immediate and irrepara-
ble harm if the court records are not sealed;
(b) that no less restrictive alternative will adequately protect the specific in-
terest of the person or entity sought to be protected;
(c) that sealing will effectively protect the specific interest of the person or
entity sought to be protected without being overbroad; and
(d) that sealing will not restrict public access to information that is detri-
mental to public health or safety, or to information concerning the ad-
ministration of public office or the operation of government that violates
any law or involves misuse of public funds or public office.
2. Protectible Interests: "Protectible interests" which may be the basis
of an order under this rule include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) a right of privacy or privilege established by law, including but not lim-




(d) the protection of the identity or privacy of an individual who has been
the subject of a sexually related assault or injury.
3. Court Records: For purposes of this rule, the term "court records"
shall include all documents and records filed in connection with any matter
before any civil court in the State of Texas. This rule shall not apply to discov-
ery materials not filed with a court or to documents filed with a court in camera
solely for the purpose of obtaining a ruling on the discoverability of such docu-
ments.
B. Unless provided to the contrary by statute or other law, before a judge
may seal any court records, the following prerequisites must be satisfied:
I. Hearing: A hearing shall be held in open court, open to the public, at
which the parties may present evidence to support or oppose the motion to seal
court records; however, the hearing may be conducted in camera upon request
by any party, if the court finds from affidavits submitted or other evidence that
an open hearing would reveal the information which is sought to be protected.
At the hearing the court may consider affidavit evidence if the affiant is present
and available for cross examination. Any person, not a party, desiring to sup-
port or oppose the sealing of court records, may intervene for the limited pur-
pose of participating in the hearing and in any subsequent proceedings involving
the motion to seal or the grant or denial of a sealing order.
2. Notice: The party seeking sealing shall file a written motion in sup-
port of the sealing request. After filing the motion, the moving party shall post a
public notice at the place where notices for meetings of county governmental
bodies are required to be posted, at least fourteen days before the date set for the
hearing, stating that a hearing will be held in open court on a motion to seal
court records, stating that any person has an opportunity to appear and be heard
concerning the sealing of court records, and stating the specific time and place of
the hearing, the general type of case, the style of the case, and the case number.
After posting such notice, the moving party shall file a copy of the notice with
the clerk of the court in which the matter is pending and shall serve a copy of
the notice with the clerk of the Texas Supreme Court, who shall post the notice
in a public place.
3. Temporary Sealing Order:. A temporary sealing order may be entered
without the hearing or public notice provided for in paragraphs (B)(1) and
(B)(2) above, upon the filing of a sworn motion showing compelling need and
that immediate and irreparable harm will result before notice can be posted and
a hearing can be held as otherwise provided herein. Whenever possible, the
moving party shall serve the motion upon any other party who has already ap-
peared. Every temporary sealing order granted without posted notice or public
hearing shall be filed, shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance, shall
contain the findings required by paragraph (B)(5), shall state why the order was
granted without notice, and shall expire by its terms no more than fourteen days
after its issuance, unless within the time so fixed, for good cause shown, the
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Meetings Act,5 the Texas Government Code,6 and a number of other stat-
utes concerning public access to government information. Although the
Texas Attorney General issued fifty-four formal opinions7 and there were
several important judicial decisions in the area, these legislative develop-
ments constitute the most significant events in the access to government in-
formation area.
A. Amendments To The Texas Open Records Act
The Texas Open Records Act states that all records in the possession of a
governmental body are public unless specifically exempted from disclosure
order is extended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be
entered of record. No more than one extension may be granted unless subse-
quent extensions are unopposed. If a temporary sealing order is granted without
public notice and hearing, a motion for sealing order shall be filed, notice pro-
vided and a hearing set as elsewhere provided in these rules. On two days' no-
tice to the party who obtained the temporary sealing order or on such shorter
notice to that party as the court may prescribe, any person, whether or not a
party to the lawsuit, may move dissolution or modification of the order and in
that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expedi-
tiously as the ends of justice require.
4. Findings: In order to seal court records, the court shall make specific
findings demonstrating that a compelling need has been shown, but the findings
shall not reveal the information sought to be protected.
5. Sealing Order: A sealing order shall be specific and shall state the
case number, the style of the case, the specific findings, the conclusions of law,
the time period for which the sealed portions of the court records are to remain
sealed, and shall identify those portions of the court records which are to be
sealed and those portions which are to remain open. The order shall not reveal
the information sought to be protected. The motion to seal and the sealing or-
der shall remain in the open portion of the file.
C. Continuing Jurisdiction: Any person may intervene as a matter of right
at any time before or after judgment in connection with any motion to seal or to
unseal court records. Notwithstanding the rights of appeal provided in this
Rule, a court that enters a sealing order maintains continuing jurisdiction to
enforce, alter, or vacate that order.
D. Appeal: Except as to a temporary sealing order under paragraph (B)(3),
any sealing order, any sealing provision contained in any judgment, and any
order granting or denying a motion to alter, vacate or enforce a sealing order
shall be deemed to be a separate and independent final judgment and shall be
subject to immediate and independent appeal by any party or intervenor who
has requested, supported or opposed any sealing order.
5. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Section 2(a) of the
Texas Open Meetings Act provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act or specifically permitted in the Consti-
tution, every regular, special, or called meeting or session of every governmental
body shall be open to the public; and no closed or executive meeting or session
of any governmental body for any of the purposes for which closed or executive
meetings or sessions are hereinafter authorized shall be held unless a quorum of
the governmental body has first been convened in open meeting or session for
which notice has been given as hereinafter provided and during which open
meeting or session the presiding officer has publicly announced that a closed or
executive meeting or session will be held and identified the section or sections
under this Act authorizing the holding of such closed or executive session.
6. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN.
7. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD.-507 (1988) through Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD.-535 (1990).
1990]
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under the Act.3 The 71st legislature exempted covered "information that
identifies or serves to identify a person who, based on information in the
possession of the governmental body, appears to have been the victim of an
offense that is a felony." 9 Law enforcement agencies construed the exemp-
tion broadly and refused to disclose substantial information regarding crimi-
nal activity.10 Five weeks after the exemption became effective, the
legislature repealed the provision in a special session. I I Additionally, the
legislature amended section 3 to exempt certain information in personnel
files 12 as well as the identity of applicants for the position of chief executive
officer of institutions of higher education. 13 As amended, Exemption 17 pro-
vides that the home addresses and home telephone numbers of former offi-
cials and employees of governmental bodies and of peace officers as defined
in the Act are exempt from public disclosure.14 The Act permits not only
current employees, but also former officials and employees to choose
whether or not to allow public access to their home address and telephone
numbers.' 5 If the former employee or official fails to request that the infor-
mation remain private, then the information is subject to public access. 16
The legislature amended Exemption 15, which prohibits disclosure of
birth and death records maintained by the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the
Texas Department of Health or by a local registration official.17
8. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1990).
9. Supra, note 2.
10. The broad reading accorded the new provision by law enforcement officials provoked
an outcry from the press and the public. See FOI Focus.
II. A Subd. (23) of Subsec. 3(a), added by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., Ch. 326, § 1, effective
June 14, 1989, was repealed by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., 1st CS, Ch. 4, § 2, effective July 21, 1989.
12. Open Records Act, ch. 110, § 3(a)(2), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 467. Section 3(a)(2) of
the Texas Open Records Act excludes:
Information in personnel files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and transcripts from institutions of
higher education maintained in the personnel files of professional public school
employees; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be construed to
exempt from disclosure the degree obtained and the curriculum on such tran-
scripts of professional public school employees, and further provided that all in-
formation in personnel files of an individual employee within a governmental
body is to be made available to that individual employee or his designated repre-
sentative as is public information under this Act. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1990).
13. Open Records Act, ch. 110, § 3(a)(23), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 468. Section 3(a)(23) of
the Open Records Act exempts:
The names of applicants for the position of chief executive officer of institutions
of higher education, except that the governing body of the institution of higher
education must give public notice of the name or names of the finalists being
considered for the position at least 21 days prior to the meeting at which final
action or vote is to be taken on the employment of the individual. TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1990).
14. TEx. REv. Ov. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(17) (Vernon Supp. 1990)
15. Id.
16. Id. § 3A.
17. The legislature added the following language to Exemption 15:
(A) a birth record is public information and available to the public on and
after the 50th anniversary of the date on which the record is filed with the Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics or local registration official; and
(b) a death record is public information and available to the public on and
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The legislature cured a potential loophole in the Act regarding govern-
mental bodies who engage independent contractors or consultants to per-
form governmental functions and claim not to be able to produce documents
in the possession of those consultants.18
The amendment clarifies and embraces the Texas Attorney General's con-
struction of the Act, which held that information in the constructive posses-
sion of governmental bodies constituted public information. 19
The legislature added a new section 3B to the Act granting a special right
of access to information that relates to the requesting party beyond that held
by the general public.20 This special right of access to confidential informa-
tion strengthens a prior attorney general ruling on the subject.21
Under the Open Records Act, if a governmental body receives a request
for information that the body believes exempt from disclosure, it must
within ten days seek an attorney general's ("AG") opinion pursuant to sec-
tion 7 of the Act.22 The 71st legislature amended this section in several
respects. The Act now specifies that a governmental body must request an
AG opinion no later than ten calendar days after receiving the written re-
quest for information. 23 Although the Act previously required that the gov-
ernmental body furnish the attorney general with the documents which are
the subject of the Open Records Act request,24 section 7(b) provides that
the information in dispute should not be "disclosed to the public or the re-
questing party until a final determination has been made by the attorney
general or, if suit is filed... until a final decision has been made by the court
with jurisdiction over the suit."125 If the court issues a protective order, the
statute allows discovery of the information by the requesting party in litiga-
tion.26 Any member of the public may submit written comments to the at-
torney general regarding the information. 27 A new subsection to section 7
provides that if a party's privacy or property interest is implicated in a re-
quest for information from a governmental body, then such person has a
right to submit the person's reasoning for withholding or releasing the infor-
after the 25th anniversary of the date on which the record is filed with the Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics or local registration official. Id. § 3(a)(15).
18. The legislature amended section 3(a) to provide that:
[a]l information collected, assembled, or maintained by or for governmental
bodies, except in those situations where the governmental body does not have
either a right of access to or ownership of the information, pursuant to law or
ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business is public in-
formation and available to the public during normal business hours of any gov-
ernmental body, with the following exceptions only .... ." Tax. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-7a, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
19. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD.-462 (1987).
20. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3B (Vernon Supp. 1990).
21. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD.-461 (1987).
22. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).







mation in writing to the attorney general.28
One of the most significant amendments to the Act permits the court to
assess litigation expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by a party to a lawsuit
who substantially prevails in any litigation under the Act.29 The court re-
tains discretion over the award of attorneys' fees, but the statute directs the
court to consider whether the conduct of the government had a reasonable
basis in law and whether the suit was brought in good faith.30
Section 9 of the Open Records Act regarding copying costs as amended
provides that "[t]he State Purchasing and General Services Commission
shall from time to time determine guidelines on the actual cost of standard
size reproductions .... ,,31 Charges for copies cannot exceed the actual cost
of the copies as provided in the statute.32 In addition, public records must
be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge if the government de-
cides that such waiver or reduction is in the public interest.33 If the govern-
mental body acts in bad faith in computing costs, the person requesting
information may receive three times the amount of the overcharge. 34
Section 10 of the Act allows a governmental body seeking to challenge an
attorney general opinion ten calendar days to file such a case rather than the
three working days previously allowed by the statute.35 The amendment
requires that the attorney general be a party and that venue rest exclusively
in Travis County District Court.36
The legislature added a new subdivision to section 14 dealing with civil
discovery. 37 The attorney general previously held that nothing in the Open
Records Act purports to affect the scope of testimony of a witness taken in
discovery proceedings. 38 Dicta in a 1987 Texas Supreme Court case sug-
gested that the Open Records Act actually creates privileges to civil discov-
ery in law enforcement cases.39
B. Amendments to the Government Code
The 71st legislature also passed a comprehensive amendment to the local
28. Id.
29. Open Records Act, ch. 1248, § 15, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 5027.
30. Id.
31. Open Records Act, ch. 1248, § 16, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 5027.
32. Id. at 5028.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Open Records Act, oh. 1248, § 17, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 5028.
36. Id.
37. The amendment to the Open Records Act provides that:
"[T]his Act does not affect the scope of civil discovery under the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. The exceptions from disclosure under this Act do not create
new privileges from discovery."
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 14(f) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
38. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. H-231 (1974).
39. See Hobson v. Moore, 734 S.W. 2d 340, 341 (rex. 1987); see also Villarreal v. Domin-
guez, 745 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (holding failure of city to
timely assert Open Records Act privilege constituted waiver of right to nondisclosure).
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government code entitled The Local Government Records Act.4 The code
broadly defines "governmental record", but excludes notes, journals, diaries,
and similar documents created by an officer or employee of the local govern-
ment for the officers or employees' personal convenience. 41 The Act pro-
vides that "[l]ocal government records created or received in the transaction
of official business or the creation or maintenance of which were paid for by
public funds are declared to be public property and are subject to the provi-
sions of... [the Code]." 42 The statute fails to define "public funds", but
defines "local government" to include "[a]il district and precinct offices of a
county, municipality, public school district, appraisal district, or any other
special-purpose district or authority." 43
The Act subjects local government records to the Open Records Act."
Even government records to which access is denied under the Open Records
Act are open to public inspection seventy-five years after originally created
or received.45 Section 202.002 of the Act prohibits a local government from
destroying any record the subject matter of which is known by the custodian
to be in litigation.46 Likewise, governmental bodies cannot destroy records
subject to a request under the Open Records Act.47 Section 205.009 prohib-
its any person under contract or agreement with the local government from
refusing to provide the local government with requested records in a timely
manner and in an accessible and usable format. 48
C. Amendments To The Open Meetings Act
The legislature amended section 2(t) of the Open Meetings Act49 to pro-
vide that the "Act does not require the Credit Union Commission to deliber-
40. Local Government Records Act, ch. 1248, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4997.
The preamble to the Act states:
Recognizing that the citizens of the state have a right to expect, and the state
has an obligation to foster, efficient and cost-effective government and recogniz-
ing the central importance of local government records in the lives of all citi-
zens, the legislature finds that: (I) the efficient management of local government
records is necessary to the effective and economic operation of local and state
government; (2) the preservation of local government records of permanent
value is necessary to provide the people of the state with resources concerning
their history and to document their rights of citizenship and property; (3) conve-
nient access to advice and assistance based on well-established and profession-
ally recognized records management techniques and practices is necessary to
promote the establishment of sound records management programs in local gov-
emments, and the state can provide the assistance impartially and uniformly;
and (4) the establishment of uniform standards and procedures for the mainte-
nance, preservation, microfilming, or other disposition of local government
records is necessary to fulfill these important public purposes.
41. See TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 201.003(8)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
42. Id. § 201.005(a).
43. Id. § 201.003(7).
44. Id. § 201.009(a).
45. Id. § 201.009(b).
46. Id. § 202.002(a).
47. Id. § 202.002(b).
48. Id. § 205.009.




ate in open meetings regarding matters made confidential by law." 50 As
amended, section 406.012 of the Government Code provides that records
concerning the appointment and qualifications of notary publics shall be
kept in the office of the secretary of state as public information.5 1
D. Judicial Decisions Construing The Open Records Act
The Texas Supreme Court construed the Open Records Act in Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Mattox.52 The Houston Chronicle filed an Open
Records Act request with the Houston Independent School District
("HISD") seeking the college transcripts of district administrators who had
allegedly attained degrees from nonaccredited schools. The HISD refused
the request and sought an attorney general opinion. Without waiting for the
attorney general to rule, the Chronicle filed an application for a writ of man-
damus in district court and claimed it was entitled to immediate relief be-
cause the attorney general had ruled that such transcripts were public
information. 53
A related suit, Chapman v. Mattox,54 was pending concurrently in Harris
County. In Chapman, professional school employees challenged the attor-
ney general's interpretation of the Open Records Act requiring disclosure of
employees' college transcripts. The plaintiffs contended that the release of
such information violated their constitutional right to privacy. The attorney
general and the plaintiffs entered into an agreed order which prohibited the
attorney general from rendering any decisions requiring the disclosure of
professional school employees' college transcripts pending completion of the
71st Legislature. At the time, lobbying was underway in the legislature on
behalf of the teachers to exempt such information."
The trial court subsequently consolidated the Houston Chronicle case with
the Chapman case over the Chronicle's objection. The trial judge refused
the Chronicle's application for a writ of mandamus against the HISD, and
held "[t]hat the Chronicle lacked standing under the Open Records Act
since there had been no decision by the Attorney General that the tran-
scripts were public records."'5 6
The Chronicle sought a writ of mandamus against the attorney general to
compel the attorney general to comply with his mandatory duty under the
Open Records Act. The supreme court agreed with the Chronicle; it held
that neither the attorney general nor a judge has the authority to suspend a
valid statute.57 The court decided that a judge may not supervise and direct
the manner and method of a statute's enforcement by the officers of the exec-
50. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2(t) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
51. Open Meetings Act, Ch. 4, § 2.16, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 210.
52. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1989).




57. Id. at 698.
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utive department of state government.58
The court additionally noted that the Open Records Act does not require
the attorney general to render a decision when it has already been deter-
mined that the requested information falls within an exception to the Open
Records Act.59 The Open Records Act allows the attorney general to refuse
to render a decision if he concludes that a previous determination has been
made regarding the type of information requested;6° a refusal to render a
decision may be reviewed by the courts on an abuse of discretion standard.61
In a unanimous decision, however, the court held that the attorney general
must either hold that he had made a previous determination regarding the
professional school employees' transcripts or "forthwith" render an open
records decision. 62 Finally, the court ruled that the attorney general's deci-
sion is not subject to a rigid deadline, but that the Act simply requires the
attorney general to "act within a reasonable time and not delay beyond the
time needed to reach his decision." 63
Euresti v. Valdez'" involved a writ of mandamus brought by the Cameron
County attorney seeking to vacate an order of a district judge requiring dis-
closure of testimony before a grand jury. The plaintiff in a malicious prose-
cution action sought the information and the district judge had required that
the documents be disclosed. The county attorney brought a mandamus ac-
tion and claimed that a discovery privilege was created since the requested
documents were not subject to the Texas Open Records Act. The court re-
jected this position, however, and held that "It]he fact that the Open
Records Act does not apply does not create a privilege .... 65 There is noth-
ing in the Open Records Act that indicates that items not covered in the Act
are exempt from discovery." 66 The court correctly anticipated the legisla-
ture's clarifying amendment that states "this Act does not affect the scope of
civil discovery under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. '67
E. Decisions Under The Open Meetings Act
In Texas Water Commission v. Acker,68 the Austin Court of Appeals de-
cided a critical issue under the Texas Open Meetings Act.69 The court held
that provisions of the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act







64. 769 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
65. Id. at 577.
66. Id. at 578.
67. Supra, note 37.
68. 774 S.W.2d 270 (rex. App.-Austin 1989, writ granted).
69. Supra, note 49.




In Acker, the Texas Water Commission denied the plaintiff's application
for a wastewater treatment permit. The hearings examiner recommended
that the Commission grant Acker's permit and, subsequently, the Commis-
sion conducted a public hearing on the matter. During a recess, two of the
commissioners were overheard discussing the application outside the hearing
room. The commission then issued a written order unanimously denying
Acker's permit.
Acker sued in district court for review of the agency order and claimed
that the action of the Water Commission violated the Open Meetings Act.
The trial court granted summary judgment finding that "deliberation of the
Plaintiff's permit application by two of the three members of the Texas
Water Commission in an unauthorized closed meeting without any notice
during a recess of the Commission's November 26, 1986, hearing on said
permit" constituted a violation of the Act.72 The district court declared the
commission's order null and void and remanded the case to the commission
for further proceedings.
On appeal, the commission argued that conversations between commis-
sioners, limited to the hearing record, do not represent a meeting under the
Open Meetings Act as a matter of law. The commission argued in the alter-
native that APTRA allows an agency member to communicate ex parte with
other members of a multi-member agency in contested cases; therefore, such
communication between agency members cannot violate the Open Meetings
Act. In its opinion, the court noted that "APTRA explicitly permits agency
members to communicate ex parte with other agency members on issues of
fact or law."'73 APTRA apparently conflicts with the Open Meetings Act
which prohibits nonpublic verbal exchanges between a quorum of members
attempting to arrive at a decision on any public business.74 The court noted
that APTRA, adopted after the Open Meetings Act, is a specific statute with
specific application, whereas the Open Meetings Act is a general statute with
general application. 7" "APTRA allows private communications between
agency members . . .;76 thus, verbal exchange does not violate the Open
Meetings Act.77 The Texas Supreme Court has agreed to review this
decision.
In another Open Meetings case, Collin County, Texas filed suit in federal
court seeking a declaratory judgment regarding a highway project conducted
in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act. 78 The defend-
ants sought summary judgment against Collin County because it authorized
71. Acker, 774 S.W.2d at 274.
72. Id. at 271-72.
73. Id. at 273.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 274.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Collin County, Texas v. Homeowners Ass'n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods
(Haven), 716 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
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Plaintiff's suit in a meeting not complying with the Open Meetings Act.7 9
The court found that Collin County violated the Act by failing to identify
the particular controversy to be discussed in executive session.80 At the
summary judgment hearing the defendant conceded that Collin County
could ratify its actions pursuant to a properly noticed and convened meet-
ing.81 Based upon that concession, the court denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment and allowed Collin County thirty days within which
to ratify its filing of the suit.8 2
F Texas Attorney General Opinions Under The Open Records Act
The attorney general rendered the following decisions under the Texas
Open Records Act during the survey period:
ORD-507. The attorney general held that records used or developed by the
Department of Health in an investigation of a home health agency and made
confidential under section 10(d) of article 4447u8 3 were exempt from public
disclosure under section 3(a)(1) of the Texas Open Records Act.84 The at-
torney general rejected the argument that section 5.08(k) of article 4495b,
the Medical Practices Act, authorizes the Department of Health to release a
patient's medical records obtained in an investigation of a home health
agency.85
ORD-508. The attorney general required the release of the names of prison-
ers transferred from county jail to the Texas Department of Corrections af-
ter the completed transfer.86 The sheriff of Travis County had argued that
the information should be protected from disclosure because the requesting
party was an inmate who intended to use the information to injure another
prisoner. The attorney general, however, rejected this argument finding that
"[t]he motives of a person seeking information under the Act do not control
whether specific information may be withheld."'87
ORD-509. The attorney general held that the Austin-Travis County Private
Industry Council constitutes a "governmental body" within the meaning of
the Open Records Act and, thus, bid proposals submitted to the council
must be released after a contract is awarded. 8
ORD-510. In this decision, the attorney general determined whether a pri-
vate university whose students were receiving tuition equalization grants
pursuant to the Texas Education Code expended public funds or was sup-
ported by public funds within the meaning of section 2(l)(f) of the Texas




83. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447u was repealed by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 678,
§ 13(l).
84. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-507 (1988).
85. Id.
86. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-508 (1988).
87. Id.
88. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-509 (1988).
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Open Records Act. The attorney general decided that the university was not
subject to the Act merely because its students received the equalization
grants.89
ORD-511. The attorney general held in this request that the Open Records
Act requires attorneys for governmental bodies covered by the Act to deter-
mine whether the governmental body should claim exemption from disclo-
sure under section 3(a)(3), which deals with information relating to litigation
of a criminal or civil nature. 90 The attorney general ruled that such informa-
tion must be disclosed to the public once it has been seen by the parties in
litigation with a governmental body.91
ORD-512. The attorney general decided that the Open Records Act does
not allow governmental bodies to deny requests for copies of public
records.92
0RD-513. Since the Open Records Act excludes the judicial branch from
the definition of governmental body, the attorney general held that the Act
does not apply to grand juries.93 An individual or entity acting as the grand
jury's agent may have information that is in the constructive possession of
the grand jury; therefore, this information is not subject to the Act.94
ORD-514. The attorney general determined that the Secretary of State's
contract to publish the official Texas Administrative Code is not protected
from disclosure under the Act.95
ORD-515. Complaints regarding a public employee's work performance
that do not reveal crimes or the violation of specific laws to the officials
enforcing those laws are not protected under the "informer's privilege."' 96
The attorney general also held that a governmental body seeking reconsider-
ation of an attorney general's decision cannot raise exceptions that it failed
to raise in its initial request unless it shows compelling reasons for initially
withholding the information and subsequently raising the additional
exceptions.97
ORD-516. The Texas Attorney General Child Support Enforcement Office
requested information from the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") re-
garding DPS employees. After providing partial information, the depart-
ment refused to disclose the employees' home addresses and telephone
numbers since the Open Records Act exempts such information from disclo-
sure. The Department of Public Safety sought a determination of whether
federal law overcame the exemption from disclosure under the Act. The
89. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-510 (1988).
90. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-511 (1988).
91. Id.
92. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-512 (1988).
93. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-513 (1988).
94. Id.
95. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-514 (1988).
96. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-515 (1988).
97. Id.
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attorney general held that "neither the federally-approved state child sup-
port plan [n]or federal law grants the state or its local child support offices
the authority to require that a state agency release information in violation
of the Open Records Act.98
ORD-517. The Secretary of State was asked to provide certain computer
programs developed in connection with NCR Corporation and a University
of Texas linguistics professor to conduct searches of the corporate and Uni-
form Commercial Code records stored in the Secretary of State's computer.
The attorney general acknowledged that computer programs are not gener-
ally considered a record but ruled that all information created by govern-
mental bodies is subject to the Open Records Act.99 The attorney general
found, however, that the legislature altered the method of access to com-
puter software and, thus, Article 4331a controlled the type of information at
issue. 10
ORD-518. The district attorney of Tyler County asked the attorney general
whether the Open Records Act prohibited the release of information relating
to a bad check fund. The penal code creates the fund, which allows a person
charged with writing a bad check to make restitution through the prosecu-
toes office. The district attorney sought to protect the names of persons who
paid bad check fees to the county. The attorney general held that these
names must be released to the public.101
ORD-519. The Bexar Metro 911 Network District is a governmental body
established to receive emergency telephone calls. The district asked the at-
torney general whether it must produce a recording containing a request for
aid in an incident involving the murder of four family members. The attor-
ney general ruled that when the district receives a request for one of the
tapes in its possession, it is prohibited from transferring the tape to another
governmental body in order to avoid disclosure.1°2 Once the tapes have
been transferred, the district must direct the requesting party to the govern-
mental agency for whom the call was taken.10 3
ORD-520. The San Antonio City Public Service Board received and
honored a request for the names and addresses of customers. However, the
Board objected to disclosure of the most recent utility bill and sales tax sta-
tus of commercial and industrial municipal utility customers. The attorney
general ruled that the tax status of the board's customers must be
disclosed.Yo4
ORD-521. The Bexar County District Attorney's Office received three re-
quests for information regarding the death of an individual while in the cus-
98. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-516 (1989).
99. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-517 (1989).
100. Id.
101. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-518 (1989).
102. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-519 (1989).
103. Id.
104. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-520 (1989).
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tody of Bexar County. Article 49.18(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that a report of the cause of a custodial death be filed
pursuant to an investigation.105 The attorney general held that such a custo-
dial death report, including its compilation and attachments, is not public
information. 10 6
ORD-522. The Texas Racing Commission received Open Records Act re-
quests for racetrack license applications. Section 2.15 of the Racing Com-
mission Act provides that all nonconfidential records of the commission are
open to public inspection.10 7 However, Section 2.15 explicitly prohibits dis-
closure of investigatory files except in criminal proceedings or in a commis-
sion hearing. 10 8 The racing commission contended that an application for
license is automatically a part of the investigatory fie for the applicant. The
attorney general rejected the argument and held that racetrack license appli-
cations are not exempt from disclosure by the Texas Racing Act.1 9 Only
material regarding a person's criminal history or management and conces-
sion contracts submitted as part of racetrack license applications may be
withheld under the Racing Act.110
ORD-523. The Texas Attorney General decided that the Open Records Act
protects federal tax returns, tax return information and background financial
information of a member of the Veteran's Land Program from public
disclosure. 11
ORD-524. This Open Records Act Request concerned the necessity of a
university's release of records regarding a deceased student. The attorney
general ruled that upon the student's death the university must disclose
records previously held confidential under the Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act112 and the Open Records Act." 3
ORD-525. The Secretary of State received a request for a listing of all com-
plaints against notary publics under the Open Records Act. The Secretary
of State released partial information; however, the agency refused to release
the entire complaint file. The attorney general ordered the release of the
entire fie, except criminal history information provided by the Department
of Public Safety." 4
ORD-526. This decision concerned the disclosure of teacher transcripts held
by the Alief Independent School District. The attorney general held that an
amendment to the Open Records Act passed by the 71st legislature requires
the governmental body holding public school employee transcripts to edit
105. TEx. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 4918(b) (1990).
106. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-521 (1989).
107. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. AiN. art. 179e, § 2.15 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
108. Id.
109. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-522 (1989).
110. Id.
111. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-523 (1989).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1986).
113. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-524 (1989).
114. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-525 (1989).
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information other than the employee's name, degree obtained and the
courses taken from such transcripts prior to disclosure.' Is Thus, the district
must delete grades as well as any extraneous information. 116
ORD-527. The Court Reporters' Certification Board requested an opinion
from the attorney general regarding the disclosure of documents revealing
the names and addresses of all shorthand reporters who received a notice of
an informal disciplinary hearing and copies of all notices of formal hearings.
The attorney general rejected the board's argument that the Open Records
Act did not apply to its records and disagreed with a supreme court decision
that exempted all of the board's records from public disclosure. 17 Since the
supreme court's decision conflicted with the Open Records Act, the attorney
general ordered disclosure of the information.118
ORD-528. The attorney general determined whether a court appointed re-
ceiver for the State Board of Insurance must reveal information about an
investigation into possible collusion between regulated companies in this de-
cision. The attorney general held the liquidator-receiver subject to the Texas
Open Records Act; thus, information in the possession of the receiver is pub-
lic unless exempted from disclosure under the Act.1 19 In this case, since the
receiver had not requested a ruling on the applicability of the Act to the
requested information within 10 days from his receipt of the request, the
information was presumed public. 120 The attorney general held that "[t]he
fact that a governmental body contends that it is not subject to the act does
not relieve it of its responsibility to request a decision; the applicability of the
act is but a necessary preliminary determination under section 7."121
JM-1013. This Open Records Act request concerned Texas governors' re-
moval of records created during their administration from state custody.
The attorney general held that records compiled by the governor's office in
carrying out its statutory duties constitute "public records" under the Texas
Government Code122 and the Open Records Act 123 and "governmental
records" within the meaning of the Texas Penal Code.124 The attorney gen-
eral noted that whether particular records sought to be removed by the de-
parting governor are within the ambit of the Acts must be determined on a
case by case basis.125




119. Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-528 (1989).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. TEx. GOV'T. CODE ANN. (Vernon Supp. 1990).
123. Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
.124. Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.01(1)(A) and 37.10(a)(3) (Vernon 1989). Op. Tex.




G. Attorney General Opinions Construing The Open Meetings Act
JM-985. In this opinion the attorney general held that the Texas Open
Meetings Act authorizes notice of two hours only for emergency meetings.
Furthermore, ratification of the emergency meeting's minutes fails to vali-
date violations of the Act.126
JM-1004. A member of a school district board of trustees sued the other
members in federal court. While an appeal was pending, the member sought
to attend an executive session held to discuss the defense of the lawsuit. The
attorney general found that the other board members could meet without
the plaintiff board member because this instance represented "an exception
from the usual rule that each board member must have an opportunity to
attend all board meetings." 127 The attorney general noted that allowing the
plaintiff to attend attorney/client conferences would inhibit attorney/client
communications and undermine the efficacy of the adversary system.128
JM-1037. In this request, the attorney general considered whether an emer-
gency meeting held by a city council complied with the Open Meetings Act.
During a regularly scheduled meeting, the council reviewed pleadings of a
lawsuit filed by an employee the same day he was terminated. The council
posted a notice in order to hold an emergency meeting within two hours to
discuss indemnifying the Alief City Council and hiring a law firm to repre-
sent the Alief City Council. 129 Based upon the facts presented in the re-
quest, the attorney general found no "emergency" within the meaning of the
Open Meetings Act.1 30 The attorney general clarified his opinion and stated
that emergency meetings are limited to cases that involve imminent threats
to public health and safety or unforeseeable situations requiring immediate
action by the governmental body.131
JM-1058. The attorney general decided whether, under the Open Meetings
Act, a governmental body may, without notice, hold briefing sessions to re-
ceive information from staff members. The attorney general held that meet-
ings between members of a governmental body and its employees for the
purpose of receiving information or asking questions are not subject to the
Open Meetings Act. 132 The 70th legislature added section 2A to the Open
Meetings Act which requires governmental bodies to maintain a certified
agenda or tape recording of executive sessions.133 Subsection 2A(h) of the
Act provides: "[n]o individual, corporation, or partnership shall, without
lawful authority, knowingly make public the certified agenda or tape record-
ing of a meeting or that portion of a meeting that was closed under authority
126. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-985 (1988).
127. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1004 (1989).
128. Id.
129. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1037 (1989).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1058 (1989).
133. TEX. Rev. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17, § 2A (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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of this Act."134 In a separate opinion,135 Senator Kent Caperton requested a
ruling determining whether subsection 2A(h) restricts speech rights of gov-
ernmental employees. Caperton argued that local authorities had inter-
preted the provision as prohibiting persons present in an executive session
from making statements regarding the subject matter of the session. Senator
Caperton questioned whether this interpretation abrogated the guarantee of
freedom of speech found in the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.1 36 The attorney general interpreted "subsection 2A(h) as applying
only to the records of executive sessions which governmental bodies are re-
quired to keep pursuant to section 2A of the Act. It does not prohibit per-
sons who are present at the executive session from afterwards talking about
the subject matter of the session." 137
JM-1072. The chairman of the House Public Education Committee asked
the attorney general whether the Texas Open Meetings Act applies to school
district trustee committees including less than a quorum of the board. The
attorney general held that if one or more members of a school district board
of trustees meets to discuss public business, then the committee meeting is
subject to the Open Meetings Act.138
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS CONCERNING ELECTIONS
In State Democratic Executive Committee v. Raines 139 the Texas Supreme
Court reviewed procedures for selecting replacement candidates in an elec-
tion for the court of appeals. The Republican Party State Executive Com-
mittee had conducted a telephone poll and arrived at a replacement
nominee. The supreme court decided that this telephone poll violated sec-
tion 145.036(d) of the Texas Election Code.140 The Republican party relied
on its party bylaws to validate the selection. The supreme court specifically
held that party rules must be consistent with state law and that, pursuant to
the Election Code, a telephone poll was not permitted.1 41 The court ordered
the Secretary of State to alter his certification to encompass only candidates
nominated in accordance with the Election Code.142
The Texas Supreme Court also decided whether a county commissioner
convicted of official misconduct could be removed from office based upon
acts prior to his reelection. 143 In a per curium opinion the supreme court
held that since all the acts for which the commissioner was convicted oc-
curred prior to his reelection, section 87.001 of the Local Government Code
134. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 § 2A(h) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
135. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1071 (1989).
136. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
137. Id.
138. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-1072 (1989).
139. 758 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1988).
140. Id. at 227. TEX. ELEC. CODE. ANN. § 145.036(d) (Vernon 1986).
141. Raines, 758 S.W.2d at 228. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 145.036(d) (Vernon 1986).
142. Raines, 758 S.W.2d at 228. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 145.036(d) (Vernon 1986).
143. Talamantez v. Strauss, 774 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1989).
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prohibited his removal from office.44
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals decided three election cases during
the survey period. In Medrano v. Gleinser 145 the appellate court affirmed a
lower court ruling that voided an election for a county commissioner in
Goliad County.'" Ralph Medrano was certified as the winner of the elec-
tion by a margin of one vote. The losing candidate, Leo Gleinser, filed an
election contest suit and claimed that votes had been illegally cast in favor of
Medrano. The closeness of the election and testimony at trial narrowed the
decisional focus to one illegal voter, Nicholas Davila, who was disqualified
from voting because of a prior felony conviction.147 Davila stated that he
voted for Gleinser, but the trial court chose to disbelieve the witness.
Although there was no way of directly proving that Davila had voted for
Medrano rather than Gleinser, the appellate court held that the fact finder is
not compelled to believe such a witness.' 48
State v. Fischer 149 involved an effort to have a candidate for county attor-
ney declared ineligible. The trial court found for the candidate but the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed and rendered.150 Fischer, a candi-
date for Willacy County Attorney, faced challenge because he failed to con-
tinuously reside in Wiliacy County for the six months immediately
preceding the filing deadline for a place on the primary election ballot. A
jury found that the candidate had resided in the county for the requisite
period. In reversing the trial court's decision, the appellate court first deter-
mined that a private attorney acting as Willacy County Attorney Pro Tem in
this case had standing to file suit.' 5 ' Second, the court found no evidence to
support the jury finding that the candidate had continuously resided in Wil-
lacy County for the requisite time period.152 "Even though a person need
not remain in one place for a set length of time to establish residency, we
[the court] cannot hold that these activities, standing alone, established Wil-
lacy County as appellee's residence or domicile .... 011 3
Lerma v. Raymond'5 4 involved a candidate's attempt to prevent the
placement of another candidate on the ballot for a general election for the
position of county judge. On June 11, 1988, the incumbent county judge
died and committees of the respective national parties selected a candidate.
Baldemar Alaniz petitioned to have his name placed on the ballot as an in-
dependent candidate. The court, for the purposes of argument, agreed that
strict interpretation of the Election Code is not mandated when reviewing
144. Id. at 662.
145. 769 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
146. Id. at 688.
147. Id. at 689.
148. Id. at 690.
149. 769 S.W.2d 619 (rex. App.- Corpus Christi 1989, writ dismd w.o.j.).
150. Id. at 624.
151. Id. at 620.
152. Id. at 624.
153. Id.
154. 760 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
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the sufficiency of petition signatures. 155 The court refused, however, to ex-
cuse "total omission of such information as the voter's registration number
or the resident address entirely or the printed name or the signature .... ,"156
Love v. Veselka 157 also involved a challenge to a petition to place a candi-
date on a ballot. Almost all of the persons signing the petition failed to
designate the State of Texas as the signer's residence address. Section
1.005(17) of the Election Code defines the term "residence address" as "the
street address and any apartment number, or the address at which mail is
received if the residence has no address, and the city, state, and zip code that
correspond to a person's residence." 158 The court of appeals held that the
Code did not require inclusion of the state in the petition.159
A voter petition was also at issue in Baugh v. Williams.16  In that case, a
citizen filed a petition which, if effective, required the City of Alto to hold an
election on approval of proposed indebtedness for rehabilitation of its sani-
tary sewer system. The petition contained seventy-eight signatures, but no
other information accompanied the signatures. The city argued that the pe-
tition must comply with the Election Code which requires additional infor-
mation before there can be an election. The court of appeals agreed and held
that the petition failed.1 61
In Baber v. Rosser 162 the Plaintiff sought to have an election incorporating
the City of Rosser declared void. The trial court validated the election, but
the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed and held that a city which is already
incorporated and which has not been legally dissolved cannot be
reincorporated. 163
Finally, in Overton v. The City of Austin, 16 plaintiffs sought to invalidate
the City of Austin's at-large, majority place system for election of city coun-
cil members under the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965.165 The district
court found no violation. The Fifth Circuit, in a per curium opinion,
affirmed. 166
III. ANNEXATION
in City of Willow Park v. Bryant 167 residents sought a declaratory judg-
155. Id. at 730.
156. Id. at 729-30.
157. 764 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ); see afro Sears v.
Strake, 764 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, mand. overr.) (relator sought to
have respondent ordered to reject the application and petition of candidate for place on ballot
because of defects in the petition).
158. Love, 764 S.W.2d at 564 (citing TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.005(17) (Vernon 1986).
159. Id. at 565.
160. 762 S.W.2d 627 (rex. App.- Tyler 1988, no writ).
161. Id. at 630.
162. 770 S.W.2d 629 (rex. App.- Dallas 1989, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
163. Id. at 630.
164. 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989).
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973dd-6 (1982).
166. Overton, 871 F.2d at 529.
167. 763 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
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ment invalidating annexation ordinances. The district court held the ordi-
nances invalid.' 68 The court of appeals held that failure to make the
attorney general a party to the suit did not deprive the trial court ofjurisdic-
tion; however, a challenge to the validity of two of the annexation ordi-
nances was barred by limitations because it was brought more than four
years after passage. 169 The court of appeals reversed part of the lower
court's ruling regarding two of the three ordinances under attack. 170 The
court affrmed the trial court's holding that the residents had standing to
bring the suit, but reversed the holding that one of the ordinances was void
for lack of evidence.17 1 The appellate court further held that challenges to
the two additional ordinances were barred by limitations 172 and that these
two ordinances were valid from the dates of enactment.173
IV. TORT LIABILITY
The current Survey period includes decisions assessing both the validity of
claims for damages resulting from governmental conduct and the scope of
governmental immunity.174 This section addresses judicial decisions consid-
ering the notice requirements for claims against governmental entities, the
federal cause of action for deprivation of civil rights,175 and the waiver of
governmental immunity under Texas Tort Claims Act.' 76
,4. Notice Requirements
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, 177 many cities impose notice
requirements upon tort claimants.' 73 Failure to observe notice require-
ments has been held to foreclose any recovery. 17 9 In City of Dallas v. Dono-
van,180 the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment against the City of
Dallas, in part because the city had actual notice of the hazardous condition
that caused the Plaintiff's injury. 18' The Plaintiff suffered injuries in a traffic
collision at an intersection where a stop sign was down.
168. Id. at 508.
169. Id. at 508-509.




174. For a general outline of the scope of Texas governmental immunity, see Babcock &
Collins, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 409, 452 (1981).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
176. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE §§ 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1990).
177. TEx. Loc. Gov'T. CODE ANN. § 51.077 (Vernon 1988).
178. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 101.101 (Vernon 1986).
179. LaBove v. City of Groves, 602 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980)(advisory letter to city not conforming to notice requirements failed to constitute notice), writ
ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 608 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1980); Bowling v. City of Port Arthur, 522
S.W.2d 270, 273 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(fiing unverified notice with
city manager instead of verified notice with city commission as required failed to constitute
notice).
180. 768 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
181. Id. at 908.
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The court noted that "[a] governmental unit is immune from liability for
damages based on a claim arising from the removal or destruction of a traffic
or road sign by a third party unless the governmental unit fails to correct the
situation within a reasonable time after actual notice. ' 182 Rejecting the
city's argument that it never received actual notice,18 3 the court relied on (1)
testimony that an accident witness reported the downed stop sign days prior
to the accident, (2) evidence that the city required police officers and sanita-
tion workers who routinely passed through the intersection to report any
downed stop sign, and (3) testimony by four witnesses that the sign was
down for at least several days.'8 4
The Texarkana Court of Appeals considered the actual notice exception in
Rosales v. Brazoria County.185 In Rosales the court rejected the county's
argument that a Tort Claims Act' 86 suit against a county requires direct
notice of the claim to the county judge or the commissioner's court.187 Rec-
ognizing that "[t]he purpose of the notice is to insure a prompt recording of
claims and to enable the governmental unit to investigate and gather infor-
mation to guard against unfounded claims,"' 8 the court stated that "[i]f an
agent or representative who received notice had a duty to gather facts and
report, the notice is imputed to the government." 8 9 In this case, the sher-
iff's department investigators arrived at the scene immediately after the au-
tomobile accident and filed both internal investigation and accident reports.
The officers had a duty to investigate the accident and report their findings
to the county; thus, the court imputed actual notice to the county.190 Ac-
cordingly, the court reversed summary judgment for the county. 191
182. Id. at 906 (citing TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 101.060(a)(3) (Vernon 1986)).
183. 768 S.W.2d at 908. The court of appeals approved the trial court's definition of "ac-
tual notice" as "information concerning a fact actually communicated to or obtained by a city
employee responsible for acting on the information so received or obtained." Id. (citing City of
Texarkana v. Nard, 575 S.W.2d 648, 651-663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n~r.e.)).
184. 768 S.W.2d at 909. The court of appeals commented that even without the excited
utterance of the accident witness, the circumstantial evidence of actual notice sufficiently sup-
ported the jury finding. Id.
185. 764 S.W.2d 342 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
186. TEx. CIrv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (Vernon 1986) provides:
(a) A governmental unit is entitled to receive notice of a claim against it
under this chapter not later than six months after the day that the incident
giving rise to the claim occurred. The notice must reasonably describe:
(1) the damage or injury claimed;
(2) the time and place of the incident; and
(3) the incident.
(c)" The notice requirements... do not apply if the governmental unit has
actual notice that death has occurred, that the claimant has received some in-jury, or that the claimant's property has been damaged.
187. 764 S.W.2d at 343.
188. Id. at 344 (citing City of Houston v. Torres, 621 S.W.2d 588, 591 (rex. 1981)).
189. 764 S.W.2d at 344 (citing City of Galveston v. Shu, 607 S.W.2d 942 (rex. Civ. App.-
Houston (Ist Dist.] 1980, no writ); City of Texarkana v. Nard, 575 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
190. 764 S.W.2d at 345.
191. Id. In so doing, the court also discounted the county's argument that county govern-
ment is more analogous to state government than to city government and that, therefore, the
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In Woomer v. City of Galveston,192 as in Rosales, lack of formal notice
failed to defeat suit against a city where it possessed actual notice of the
injury, the probable cause of the injury and the names and addresses of all
involved. In Woomer, the director of the Sheriff's Beach Control completed
a written report after investigating a drowning at a beach marked by signs
stating "no swimming." City representatives were present during the inves-
tigation. Reversing summary judgment in favor of the city and county, the
court of appeals concluded that notice was not required because the investi-
gator "was impliedly charged with disseminating the report to the interested
authorities." 193
L Physical Incapacity
In Hatcher v. City of Galveston 194 the Houston Court of Appeals recog-
nized that physical incapacity precludes application of a city charter notice
requirement. 195 Although the Plaintiff detailed his injury and medical his-
tory in support of his incapacity, the trial court held that the Plaintiff's writ-
ten notice to the city more than a year after his injury failed to comply with
the city's forty-five day notice requirement. Pointing out that Texas courts
have long recognized an exception to notice requirements in city charters for
a party unable to comply, the court held that the exception encompassed
physical as well as mental incapacity. 196 The court accordingly reversed the
summary judgment in favor of the City of Galveston. 197
B. Liability Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
1. Qualified Immunity for Law Enforcement
During the Survey period, both state and federal courts addressed claims
by individuals that municipalities and governmental entities deprived them
of their civil or property rights. In Lockhart v. City of Garland 198 city police
officers arrested one of the Plaintiffs for failure to stop at a red light, driving
without a license and driving without proof of mandatory insurance. In re-
sponse, the Plaintiffs brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. section
1983. The city argued that section 1983 liability may not be imposed upon a
municipality solely because of the acts of its police officers. The Plaintiffs
countered that the city ratified the officers' alleged misconduct two years
rule of agency should not apply to counties. The court of appeals reasoned that the rule of
agency is particularly inappropriate to state government which is "vast and compartmental-
ized," especially when the three branches of state government - legislative, executive and judi-
cial - are under no duty to report information to one another. Id. at 344.
192. 765 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
193. Id. at 839. The court went on to state that "(ilf this were not so, then any department
whose duties included that of investigating accidents under the Texas Tort Claims Act could
defeat any action against the State or its political subdivisions by merely making the report and
placing it in its file cabinet." Id.
194. 775 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
195. Id. at 39.
196. Id. at 39.
197. Id.
198. No. CA3-85-0783-R (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1988) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
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after the arrest by indemnifying its officers for section 1983 liability. Grant-
ing the city summary judgment, the district court determined that the city's
indemnification did not preclude application of Monell v. Dept of Social
Services.199 Hence, the city could not be held liable merely as the employers
of the officers.2°0
The City of Garland also successfully defended a motorist's civil rights
action against both the city and a city police officer in Gassner v. City of
Garland.20 1 Gassner claimed that a city police officer used excessive force in
arresting him without probable cause.202 While rushing to a shopping center
with his wife to locate their lost eight year old son, the officer stopped
Gassner for making an illegal right turn. After giving an urgent and evi-
dently confusing explanation, Gassner attempted to leave; to prevent this,
the officer applied a chokehold, handcuffed Gassner and arrested him.203
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court defined the
qualified immunity from suit enjoyed by police officers in Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald:2" 4 "[G]overnmental officials performing discretionary functions gener-
ally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." 20 5 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit
noted that the Court in Anderson v. Creighton20 6 refined the qualified immu-
nity test set out in Harlow: the contours of the right the official is alleged to
have violated "must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would un-
derstand that what he is doing violates that right."0207
The court then addressed two critical issues: first, whether a reasonable
officer in the arresting officer's position could have concluded that there was
probable cause to arrest plaintiff for refusing to comply with the officer's
lawful order; and, second whether the offense of refusing to comply with a
lawful order related to the offense with which Plaintiff was actually
charged. 20 8 Since the arresting officer could have required the Plaintiff to
stay at the scene for a reasonable period of time, the court concluded that a
reasonable officer would have considered Plaintiff's attempt to leave the
scene a failure to follow a police officer's lawful order.2°9 The court also
199. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding section 1983 liability may not be imposed upon a city
solely because of its employee's acts).
200. No. CA3-85-0783-R (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1988).
201. 864 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1989).
202. 864 F.2d at 396.
203. Id.
204. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
205. 864 F.2d at 396 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
206. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
207. 864 F.2d at 397 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
208. 864 F.2d at 399. In Trejo v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit
previously stated that the legality of an arrest can be established by proving probable cause to
believe that the Plaintiff had committed a crime other than the one with which he eventually
was charged existed, provided that the "crime under which the arrest is made and [the] crime
for which probable cause exists are in some fashion related." United States v. Atkinson, 450
F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Mills v. Wainwright, 415 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert denied, 406 U.S. 923 (1972)).
209. 864 F.2d at 399-400.
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concluded that the disorderly conduct offense arose out of the same conduct
as the plaintiff's failure to follow a police officer's lawful order; thus, the two
offenses were related. 210 The court held that the arresting officer was enti-
tled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would have had prob-
able cause to believe that Plaintiff was committing a crime related to that
with which he was actually charged. Accordingly, the court rendered judg-
ment rendered in favor of the arresting officers. 21'
The Fifth Circuit considered another civil rights claim against a city and
its chief of police in McConney v. City of Houston.212 In McConney, police
officers arrested the Plaintiff for public intoxication and detained the Plaintiff
pursuant to the city's four hour detention rule although a booking officer
determined that he was not intoxicated. Relying upon the Plaintiff's conces-
sion that the chief of police enjoyed qualified immunity under Anderson v.
Creighton21 3 and upon the lack of evidence establishing a connection be-
tween the chief of police and either Plaintiff's arrest or the four hour deten-
tion rule, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment against the
chief of police. 214
The court stated that the city can be liable under section 1983 "only if a
municipal policy caused the deprivation of a right protected by the Constitu-
tion or federal laws." 21 5 The city argued on appeal that the post-arrest de-
tention of those charged with public intoxication is constitutional; therefore,
its policy did not deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional right. Relying on
the First Circuit's approach to a similar issue in Thompson v. Olson,21 6 the
Fifth Circuit concluded that "a person may constitutionally be detained for
at least four or five hours following a lawful warrantless arrest for public
intoxication without the responsible officers having any affirmative duty dur-
ing that time to inquire further as to whether the person is intoxicated, even
if requested to do so. However, once a responsible officer actually does as-
certain beyond reasonable doubt that one who has been so arrested is in fact
not intoxicated, the arrestee should be released. '217 The court then noted
that even though city authorities knew that the Plaintiff had not been intoxi-
cated the city failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jury finding that the city policy contemplated continued unbailable de-
tention for four hours.218 Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment
against the city.219
210. Id. at 400.
211. Id.
212. 863 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1989).
213. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
214. 863 F.2d at 1188.
215. Id. at 1184 (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
216. 798 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987).
217. 863 F.2d at 1185 (footnote omitted).
218. There was considerable testimony that Plaintiff was diabetic and that at the time of his
arrest, if not before, he was having an insulin reaction.
219. 863 F.2d at 1189. The failure of the city to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury's liability finding limited appellate court review to "whether there was any
evidence to support the jury's verdict, irrespective of its sufficiency, or whether plain error was
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2. Violation Of Property Rights
Several decisions during the Survey period concerned section 1983 claims
that actions by municipalities violated property rights. In Glagola v. North
Texas Municipal Water District 220 the Plaintiff claimed that he was deprived
of a property right without procedural due process when the district fired
him. The Plaintiff argued that two provisions of the water district personnel
policy manual established the proposition that he could be terminated only
for just cause, thereby creating a property interest in continued employ-
ment. 22 1 Recognizing that a property interest must be derived from state
law, the district court examined Texas decisions addressing whether em-
ployee handbooks or personnel manuals may alter the general employment-
at-will rule in Texas. 222 The district court held that:
The cases... exhibit a general rule in Texas that employee handbooks
or personnel manuals unilaterally issued by an employer, standing
alone, may not expressly or impliedly limit an employer's ability to ter-
minate an employee at will. In order to alter the employment at-will
rule, a plaintiff must rely on something more than an employee hand-
book; there must be evidence of an oral agreement specifically adopting
the handbook as in Brown, or a course of conduct on the part of the
employer and employees treating the handbook as a contract, as exem-
plified in Aiello. 223
The Plaintiff relied solely upon the water district's personnel policy manual
for the existence of a property interest; thus, the district court concluded
that the Plaintiff's evidence was legally insufficient to alter his at-will status
and granted the water district summary judgment. 224
City of Houston v. Trapani225 involved an ordinance applicable to portable
signs. The ordinance provided for the appointment of a sign administrator
authorized to enforce the ordinance. The Plaintiffs dismantled their bill-
boards in response to the sign administrator's notice of an impending re-
moval deadline to sign owners. After passage of the deadline for erecting
new signs the Plaintiffs learned that the city's notice stemmed from a mis-
taken reading of the ordinance. Asserting that the city violated their prop-
committed which, if not noticed, would result in a 'manifest miscarriage of justice."' Id. at
1187 (quoting Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290, 297 (5th Cir. 1978)).
220. 705 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Tex. 1989).
221. 705 F. Supp. at 1221.
222. Id. at 1221-22 (citing Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987);
Joachim v. AT&T Information Systems, 793 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1986); Vallone v. Agip Petro-
leum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); United
Transportation Union v. Brown, 694 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 665 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
223. 705 F. Supp. at 1223.
224. Id. at 1224. The district court also declined, in the absence of case citations by the
plaintiff, to adopt plaintiff's argument that public employers should be treated differently from
private employers with regard to the creation of a property interest in continued employment.
Id. at 1223-24.
225. 771 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
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erty rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Plaintiffs sought and obtained a
judgment on a jury verdict against the city.226 The Houston Court of Ap-
peals held that the Plaintiffs possessed a property interest under state law
and proceeded to the determinative issue of "whether the sign administrator
qualifies as a policymaker, or whether that policymaking authority resides
elsewhere - such as in the City Council. '227 The city argued that final au-
thority to make policy resided exclusively in the City Council. In response,
the Plaintiffs pointed to both the ordinance itself and the testimony of the
assistant sign administrator. The court rejected the city's restrictive interpre-
tation of the term "policymaking authority," including the argument that ad
hoc council review of particular decisions precluded a determination that the
sign administrator possessed policymaking authority.228 Such an argument,
reasoned the court, would allow a municipality to enact a "mechanism for
council veto, and then contend that no policy was ever final until an ag-
grieved party lost an appeal to the council. '229 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the acts of the city sign administrator represented official policy
and affirmed the jury finding of liability against the city.230
In Alamo Carriage Service, Inc. v. City of San Antonio,231 the Plaintiffs
sued the city for revoking their permits to operate horse carriages and
claimed that their procedural due process rights had been violated. The
court of appeals examined whether the Plaintiffs possessed any protected
property rights. Since state law creates and defines property rights,232 the
court considered and found controlling numerous Texas decisions holding
that no property right exists to conduct a business in and over the streets and
highways for profit.2 33 Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in
favor of the city.234
226. 771 S.W.2d at 704.
227. Id. at 705. The court of appeals recognized that "[m]unicipal liability under § 1983
must be predicated on governmental custom or policy .. .," and that the City of Houston
cannot be liable "[i]f the conduct of the sign administrator fails to qualify as execution of
official policy .... " Id. (citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
228. 771 S.W.2d at 707.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 708.
231. 768 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 1989, no writ).
232. Id. at 940 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)).
233. 768 S.W.2d at 940-41; see City of San Antonio v. Bee-Jay Enters., 626 S.W.2d 802
(Tex. App.- San Antonio 1981, no writ) (no vested right exists in Texas to use streets and
highways in carrying on commercial business); City of San Antonio v. Fetzer, 241 S.W. 1034,
1035 (Tex. Civ. App.- San Antonio 1922, writ ref'd) (streets held in trust by state for benefit
of public at large); Greene v. City of San Antonio, 178 S.W. 6 (Tex. Civ. App.- San Antonio
1915, writ ref'd) (no right exists to use street for prosecution of private business and use for
reprosecution of private business may be prohibited or regulated as state or municipality deems
best for public good); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1175, subd. 3 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (as
a home rule city, San Antonio has "exclusive dominion, control, and jurisdiction in, over and
under the public streets, avenues, alleys, highways and boulevards").
234. 768 S.W.2d at 943.
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C. Liability Under Texas Tort Claims Act
1. Motor Vehicles
Numerous decisions during the Survey period discussed the scope of the
waiver of governmental immunity contained in the Texas Tort Claims
Act.235 In Mount Pleasant Indep. School Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg,2 6 the
estate brought a negligence action in connection with the death of a child
struck by an automobile after exiting a school bus. 237 The Texas Supreme
Court rendered judgment that the Plaintiff take nothing.238 The court noted
that the school district properly raised the defense of sovereign immunity by
special exception and stated that a Plaintiff must obtain a finding that the
damages suffered were proximately caused by a public employee's negligence
and that they arose "from-the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle
.." to avoid a sovereign immunity defense.239 The court held that the
Plaintiff failed to obtain a jury finding on this issue and concluded that sov-
ereign immunity barred the Plaintiff's claim because the evidence did not
show, as a matter of law, that the "operation or use of a motor-driven vehi-
cle caused the child's death." 240
2. Emergency Medical Services
Two decisions during the Survey period, Jordan v. City of Dallas241 and
Mejia v. City of San Antonio,242 reached different results for Plaintiffs who
received injuries involving emergency ambulance services. In Jordan, the
Plaintiff's son died of an irregular heart rhythm. The Plaintiff sued the city
235. TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 101.021 (Vernon 1986) provides that a governmen-
tal unit in the state is liable for:
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the
wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his
scope of employment if:(A) the property damage, personal injury or death arises from the oper-
ation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according
to Texas law; and
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible
personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private per-
son, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.
236. 766 S.W.2d 208 (rex. 1989), rev'g 746 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1987).
237. The child did not cross the highway toward her home after exiting the bus, although
other children did so safely while traffic was stopped. Instead, after the bus left, she walked
along the shoulder of the highway and then ran into the highway. At the time the automobile
hit her, the school bus was approximately one-quarter of a mile away. Id. at 209-10, 212.
238. Id. at 213.
239. Id. at 211 (quoting T:Ex. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986)
and citing Heyer v. N. E. Ind. School Dist., 730 S.W.2d 130, 131 (rex. App.- San Antonio
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
240. 766 S.W.2d at 212. Significantly, the supreme court reaffirmed the principle that a
plaintiff must disprove the application of sovereign immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act
even when a defendant's special exception, asserting sovereign immunity, has been overruled.
Id. at 211-212.
241. No. CA3-88-1764-T (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 1989) (Order Granting Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment).
242. 759 S.W.2d 198 (rex. App.- San Antonio 1988, no writ).
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and alleged that emergency ambulance services paramedics failed to trans-
port her son to a hospital. The district court decided that the operation of
emergency ambulance services was a governmental function and not a pro-
prietary function, rejected Plaintiff's argument that governmental immunity
had been waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act by virtue of the city's
non-use of the emergency ambulance services243 and granted summary judg-
ment to the city based on governmental immunity. 244 In Mejia, however,
-the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of
the City of San Antonio in a wrongful death and survival action.245 The
Plaintiff alleged that city emergency medical service ("EMS") technicians
negligently treated her son for injuries sustained in an automobile collision.
The EMS technicians transported the Plaintiff's son to his home instead of a
hospital; on the same day, the son checked himself into a hospital and died
shortly thereafter.
The city argued that EMS constitutes a governmental function; thus, no
exception to governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act ap-
plied in the case.246 The court agreed that providing emergency medical
services represents a governmental function,247 but rejected the city's argu-
ment that section 101.055 of the Tort Claims Act248 immunizes employees
responding to emergency calls who comply with applicable laws.24 9 After
reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that the city failed to show, as a
matter of law, that the actions of the EMS technicians were "in compliance
with any applicable laws or ordinances so as to leave no genuine question of
fact .... ,"250 The court also decided that the city had failed to show that
there was no "use" or "operation" of the EMS vehicle within the meaning of
the Texas Tort Claims Act. The use of the EMS vehicle to transport Plain-
tiff's son to his home gave rise to the fact issue whether his death "arose
from" the use or operation of the EMS vehicle.25'
3. Use Of Tangible Personal Property
Several appellate decisions during the Survey period examined the Tort
243. No. CA3-88-1764-T at 2-4 (citing Diaz v. Cent. Plains Regional Hos., 802 F.2d 141
(5th Cir. 1986)).
244. No. CA3-88-1764-T at 2 (citing Green v. City of Dallas, 665 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 1984, no writ); Brantley v. City of Dallas, 545 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
245. 759 S.W.2d at 201.
246. Id. at 200.
247. Id.
248. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.055 provides, in part that "(tihis chapter
does not apply to a claim arising (2) from the action of an employee while responding to an
emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the
laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action..
249. 759 S.W.2d at 200.
250. 759 S.W.2d at 200-01.
251. Id. at 201. One might ask whether the results in Jordan (no waiver of governmental
immunity when emergency services are not made available or are not used) and Mejia (waiver




Claims Act provision that "[a] governmental unit in the state is liable for...
personal injury... so caused by... use of tangible personal... properly
.... "252 In Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Winters253 the Plaintiffs sued the
department for sending a telegram mistakenly advising them that their hus-
band/father had died while an inmate at the Texas Department of Correc-
tions when, in fact, he had not died. The court concluded that "[tihe
machine used to transmit the message was certainly tangible personal prop-
erty, and its misuse falls within the Act," 2 4 and affirmed a jury verdict for
the Plaintiffs.
In Quinn v. Memorial Medical Center,255 a patient sued the Nueces
County Hospital District for alleged negligence in dispensing an abortifa-
cient drug. The court of appeals reversed judgment for the defendant and
held that "the dispensing of a drug by a hospital pharmacy is use of tangible
personal property and falls within the waiver provisions of the [Texas Tort
Claims Act]." 2 6 The court also rejected the Defendant's argument that it
did not waive preserved immunity because the drug was used by an off-duty
resident outside its premises and after control by Defendant had ceased.257
In Montoya v. John Peter Smith Hospital258 the wife of an emergency
room patient who died of a heart attack brought a wrongful death action
against a public hospital. The Plaintiff argued that a nurse failed to fill out
the triage slip used to assign priority to an emergency patient, and that such
failure contributed to her husband's death.259 The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals affirmed judgment for the hospital and interpreted the [Salcedo] court's
definition of 'use' to exclude 'nonuse' or failure to use property. The failure
to use the triage slip does not state a cause of action within this construction
of the Act.''26° In dicta the court also mentioned that a triage slip is not
tangible personal property within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act.261
252. T"x. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added).
253. 765 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.- Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
254. Id. at 532 (citing Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp. Dist., 659 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 1983)).
255. 764 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
256. Id. at 917 (citing Salcedo 659 S.W.2d at 32; Overton Memorial Hosp. v. McGuire, 518
S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1975)).
257. 764 S.W.2d at 917. The Plaintiff, who had been dating the resident, was injured dur-
ing an abortion induced with the drug. Under the terms of both his license and hospital policy,
the resident had authority to prescribe only for hospital patients and himself. To avoid this
issue, he initially presented the prescription for the drug to the hospital pharmacy in blank.
When challenged, he inserted his own name as the patient. The pharmacy attendants then
dispensed the drug to him, despite the apparent lack of any authorized patient.
258. 760 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
259. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the triage slip should have been prepared before and
not after her husband's collapse.
260. 760 S.W.2d at 363 (citing Floyd v. Willacy County Hosp. Dist., 706 S.W.2d 731, 733
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.c.); Vela v. Cameron County, 703 S.W.2d 721,
724-25 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brantley v. City of Dallas, 545
S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
261. 760 S.W.2d at 364. The court conceded that an electrocardiogram graph has been
held to be tangible personal property. But cf. Salcedo, 659 S.W.2d at 33 (the court noted that
the blank triage slip did not record a tangible situation as in Salcedo). The court also noted
that the existence of a blank triage form is merely incidental to the alleged failure of the triage
nurse to timely take action. 760 S.W.2d at 364. Finally, the court mentioned that if a blank
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Robinson v. Central Texas MHMR Center262 addressed whether the
waiver of governmental immunity applies not only to misuse of tangible per-
sonal property but -also to the nonuse of such property. In Robinson a men-
tally retarded epileptic drowned at Lake Brownwood while under the
Defendant's supervision. The decedent's mother brought a wrongful death
action and claimed that the Defendant negligently failed to provide a life
preserver for her son. The trial court rejected the Defendant's governmental
immunity argument and rendered judgment based on the jury verdict in
favor of the Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed in favor of the Defend-
ant, and stated that "[tihis is clearly a 'nonuse' case and not a 'misuse'
case."1263 Further, the court held that "the failure to provide a life preserver
did not constitute the 'use' of tangible personal property."1264 Thus, the
court reasoned, the waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act did not
apply.265 The Texas Supreme Court, despite a strong dissent, reversed judg-
ment for the Defendant. 266 The court's majority called on the Texas legisla-
ture to clarify the scope of the governmental immunity waiver, but
proceeded to find the present case indistinguishable from Lowe v. Texas Tech
Univ.267 In Lowe the supreme court ruled that Plaintiff stated a cause of
action within the waiver of immunity based upon the Defendant's failure to
provide a knee brace to a football player.268 The Robinson majority accord-
ingly concluded that the Defendant's failure to provide a life preserver con-
stituted a use of personal property within the meaning of the Tort Claims
Act.269
4. Special Defects
Two decisions by the Houston Courts of Appeals, Payne v. City of Galves-
ton 270 and Blankenship v. County of Galveston,271 address the duty imposed
upon municipalities by section 101.022(b) of the Tort Claims Act.272 In
form constituted tangible personal property, then the Act's requirement of tangible personal
property would become superfluous. Id.
262. 758 S.W.2d 394 (rex. App.- Eastland 1988), rev'd, 780 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1989).
263. 758 S.W.2d at 396 (citing Green v. City of Dallas, 665 S.W.2d 567 (rex. App.- El
Paso 1984, no writ)).
264. 758 S.W.2d at 396-97.
265. Id. at 397.
266. 780 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. 1989).
267. Id. at 171 (citing Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976)). Justice
Hecht dissented and argued that Lowe is distinguishable. 780 S.W.2d at 173-74.
268. 540 S.W.2d at 300.
269. 780 S.W.2d at 171. But see 780 S.W.2d at 176 (dissent of Justice Cook stating "[ijife is
not death, black is not white and, under the statute, use is not non-use").
270. 772 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
271. 775 S.W.2d at 439 (rex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
272. Section 101.022 of the Texas Tort Claims Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) If a claim arises from a premise defect, the governmental unit owes to the
claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private prop-
erty, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.
(b) The limitation of duty in this section does not apply to the duty to warn of
special defects such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets
or to the duty to warn of the absence, condition, or malfunction of traffic signs,
signals, or warning devices as is required by Section 101.060.
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Payne, the Plaintiffs sought damages arising out of the deaths of their family
members when their surrey fell over the edge of the Galveston seawall.273
For several days before the accident, the Plaintiffs walked along the seawall
and observed the seawall's sharp drop-off and the boulders at its base. In
affirming judgment for the city the court of appeals rejected the Plaintiffs'
contention that the seawall is a "special defect" under section 101.022(b) of
the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.274
In Blankenship the Plaintiff similarly slipped on algae growing on granite
rocks at the base of the Galveston seawall stairway and argued that an issue
of fact existed whether the condition constituted a special defect. The court
of appeals rejected the Plaintiff's argument and stated that "[t]he condition
was certainly not an 'excavation or obstruction' on a highway, road, or
street, which constitute[s] a 'special defect' under the express terms of the
Statute." 275
V. POLICE POWER
During the Survey period several courts discussed the police power of lo-
cal governments. In Medlin v. Palmer276 anti-abortion activists challenged
the constitutionality of a Dallas city ordinance prohibiting the use of ampli-
fled sound near medical and educational facilities. At a time when anti-abor-
tion activists were picketing clinics in Dallas, the city council amended an
ordinance to prohibit loudspeaker use within 150 feet of a hospital, nursing
home or any facility that provides outpatient surgical services.277 On appeal
by Plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the
amended ordinance.278 The Fifth Circuit noted that "city ordinances which
are content neutral with only time, place and manner restrictions, and which
are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unrea-
sonably limit alternative communication are acceptable." 279 Applying this
273. 772 S.W.2d at 474.
274. 772 S.W.2d at 476-77. The Tort Claims Act does not define the term "special defect,"
but rather gives examples such as excavations or obstructions on highways. The Texas
Supreme Court in County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177-179 (rex. 1978), construed
"'special defect' to include those defects of the same kind or class as the ones expressly men-
tioned." Courts of appeals have subsequently identified a number of special defects. 772
S.W.2d at 476-77 (citing Chappell v. Dwyer, 611 S.W.2d 158 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981,
no writ) (condition created by thick brush hiding arroyo running alongside a park road and
unmarked break in brush appearing to be an intersecting road but in fact was a drop-off into
arroyo); State v. McBride, 601 S.W.2d 552 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(slick, muddy portion of a highway which was being resurfaced); Miranda v. State, 591 S.W.2d
568 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ) (two feet of flood water covering low water cross-
ing on roadway in pre-dawn darkness)).
275. 775 S.W.2d at 442.
276. 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989).
277. For a transcription of the ordinance, see 874 F.2d at 1087 n.l.
278. The court rejected the plaintiffs' initial argument that summary judgment in favor of
Defendants was inappropriate because Defendants failed to attach a single affidavit to their
motion for summary judgment. 874 F.2d at 1088-89 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986)).
279. 874 F.2d at 1089 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47(1986)). While recognizing the "public forum" doctrine which "dictates that restrictions
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standard, the court decided that the amended ordinance made no reference
whatsoever to the content of speech and, therefore, satisfied the content neu-
tral definition.280 The court also concluded that the amended ordinance
served a substantial governmental interest in protecting people suffering
from ill health, the aged and school children. 2 1 The court further held that
the amended ordinance did not prohibit unamplilied speech, the distribution
of written material, the display of signs and placards and that, therefore, it
fell way short of precluding alternative avenues of communication. 282 Fi-
nally, the court rejected Plaintiffs' challenge that the amended ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague.283
In Brewster v. City of Dallas284 the Plaintiffs filed an action challenging
the constitutionality of a Dallas city sign ordinance intended "to promote
the safety of persons and property, improve communications efficiency, pro-
tect the public welfare, and enhance the [c]ity's appearance.1 285 In particu-
lar, the Plaintiffs contended that the ordinance violated their freedom of
speech and deprived them of property without due process of law. Address-
ing the Plaintiffs' free speech argument, the district court noted that "[a]
restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it...
seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, directly advances
that interest.... and.., reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the
given objective. " 286 Since the Plaintiffs failed to dispute the ordinance's goal
of implementing three substantial governmental interests: promoting traffic
safety, communications efficiency, and landscape quality and preservation,
the district court only addressed the two remaining inquiries: whether the
ordinance directly advanced these interests and whether the ordinance
placed upon speech are typically subject to higher scrutiny when the speech occurs in areas
historically associated with first amendment activities such as streets, sidewalks and parks,"
874 F.2d at 1089 (citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 1423 (1939)), the court pointed out
that "[t]he privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communi-
cation of views on national questions.. . is not absolute ... ." 874 F.2d at 1089 (quoting
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16).
280. 874 F.2d at 1090.
281. Id.
282. 874 F.2d at 1090 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)). The court of appeals was not persuaded by Medlin's assertion that he needed
to use a bullhorn in order to save his voice for his vocation or that the desired audience could
not be reached without resort to bullhorns because of the physical configuration of the clinic
and the adjacent sidewalks.
283. 874 F.2d at 1091. Plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that the ordinance failed to define
what constitutes a mechanical loudspeaker or sound amplifier and that the phrase "within 150
feet" is not sufficiently specific. Id. at 1091. The court stated that it was "unable to disagree
with the district court's conclusion that the terms of the ordinance are not so indefinite that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion. 874 F.2d at 1091 (citing Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
284. 703 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
285. 703 F. Supp. at 1262 (citing Revised Code of the City of Dallas § 51-7.101). The
ordinance, among other things, regulates the location of signs within business and non-busi-
ness districts, restricts the size, luminance, and movement of signs and the number of signs at a
given location. The ordinance also provides for a ten year amortization period in which own-
ers may terminate nonconforming signs and recoup their investment. 703 F. Supp. at 1262.
286. 703 F. Supp. at 1264 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
507 (1981) (plurality opinion)).
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reached any further than necessary to do so. With respect to the first in-
quiry, the district court discounted the Plaintiffs' affidavit evidence because
it failed to establish that the ordinance did not promote communications
efficiency, safety or aesthetics. 287 As to the second inquiry, the district court
stated that "[a]s long as a content-neutral regulation advances a substantial
governmental interest, the regulation is not overbroad. '288 Addressing the
Plaintiffs' due process argument, the district court noted that the Plaintiffs
bore a heavy burden of demonstrating constitutional invalidity because of
the presumption of validity attached to the ordinance.28 9 Recognizing that
the "method of terminating non-conforming uses is a decision to be made by
the City's legislative body. ..,290 and that the "legislative termination plan
need only be reasonable...," 291 the court concluded that the ordinance did
not violate due process concerns because amortization provides a reasonable
method to terminate non-conforming signs."'292 The Plaintiffs failed to ad-
duce sufficient evidence to create a fact issue concerning the constitutional
validity of the ordinance; thus, the district court granted summary judgment
to the city.293
In City of Angeles Mission Church v. City of Houston,294 the district court
addressed a challenge by a religious organization to a city ordinance prohib-
iting solicitation of funds for charitable purposes from occupants of vehicles
on public streets. The City of Houston defended the ordinance on "grounds
of safety and public convenience (i.e., traffic flow)." 295 Having determined
that the ordinance impinged on the Plaintiff's speech interest,296 the district
287. 703 F. Supp. at 1264-65. The district court recognized that "[a]s long as the City has
a reasonable basis for believing that the restriction of commercial speech directly advances the
government interest at issue, the court will not disturb that decision." 703 F. Supp. at 1264(citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328,
340 (1986); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 509; Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103,
1109-10 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 48 U.S. 1010 (1988) (judge's ruling that portable sign
ordinance barely improved city's appearance was wrongful substitution of his judgment for
that of city officials)).
288. 703 F. Supp. at 1265 (quoting SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th
Cir. 1988)). The district court then concluded that the "[o]rdinance's regulation of on-site
advertising is sufficiently tailored in the (o]rdinance to accomplish the [c]ity's interest." 703 F.
Supp. at 1266.
289. 703 F. Supp. at 1266.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. (citing City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Association, 732
S.W.2d 42,49-50 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ)); see, e.g., SDJ, Inc. v. City
of Houston, 837 F.2d at 1278 (ordinance allowing limited amortization period proper use of
police powers); Murmur Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 718 S.W.2d 790, 794-95 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (amortization reasonable use of police power even if owner will
not recoup full value from amortization and depreciation scheme).
293. 703 F. Supp. at 1267.
294. 716 F. Supp. 982 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
295. 716 F. Supp. at 984. City Ordinance art. V § 36-80(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit funds for charitable or welfare
purposes from an occupant of any motor vehicle which is on a public street or
on a street, roadway or parking area of any city park, whether or not the person
soliciting funds is or is not on a public street or other public property.
296. 716 F. Supp. at 984. The court held that the solicitation of funds for charitable pur-
poses constitutes a "speech interest" that is within the protection of the First Amendment.
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court stated that the government had the burden to show not only the valid-
ity of its asserted interest, but also the absence of less intrusive alterna-
tives. 297 The court then concluded that the city had made no showing that
the legitimate interests of safety and public convenience could not be "ful-
filled by a more narrowly-drawn provision." 298 The court accordingly de-
clared the ordinance void and enjoined its enforcement. 299
716 F. Supp. at 984 (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988); Int'l
Soc'y of Kirshna Consciousness Inc. v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1982); Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350 (1977); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (sale of religious literature by itinerant evangelists in course
of spreading their doctrine not a commercial enterprise beyond the protection of First
Amendment)).
297. 716 F. Supp. at 985 (citing Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S.
640 (1981); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)).
298. 716 F.Supp. at 985. In part, the court relied upon the fact that the city had allowed
newspaper vendors to sell newspapers on street corners, that it continues to allow the sale of
frozen food on Houston streets and that the sale of flowers to occupants of motor vehicles is
tolerated by the City. The court found "[t]here is no evidence that the solicitation of funds for
charitable purposes creates any greater safety or traffic flow concern than does the sale of
frozen desserts or newspapers on city streets." 716 F.Supp. at 984. The district court also
found that the ordinance violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under the law because
the city "made no showing of justification for denying the right to solicit funds for charitable
purposes while allowing the purely commercial activities of frozen dessert vendors and the sale
of newspapers." 716 F.Supp. at 986.
299. 716 F. Supp. at 986.
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